http://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/Nuclear%20Energy%20Futures%20Overview.pdf

I introduced CIGI in a previous post “Nuclear Policy and the Phoenix Coyotes”. This project has taken some three to four years and as a minor participant I can testify to the project’s objectivity and thoroughness. CIGI is by no means antinuclear and in my opinion the report accurately reflects the true state of nuclear energy today.  

In addition to a variety of useful data collected by the project, the report contains an objective assessment of the barriers facing the expansion of nuclear power. The resulting conclusion is that few additional nuclear plants will be built before 2030.

This, the overview of the Nuclear Energy Futures Project final reports, should be required reading for all those interested in nuclear energy. Clearly, the Canadian media have taken it seriously. Even more important for the future of Canada’s nuclear industry is that this report will influence the politicians and officials dealing with the domestic nuclear file.

I would suggest Trevor Findlay be invited to present his findings at the Canadian Nuclear Society Annual Conference in Montreal this June. I would also like to see him address the Canadian Nuclear Association seminar in Ottawa later this month but that’s unlikely since only “preaching to the choir” is allowed at the seminars.

If we don’t understand the problems, we won’t be able to develop the solutions  

The Ontario government announced last week a deal negotiated in secret with Samsung and KEPCO (Korean Electric Power Company) to build wind turbines and solar panels in Ontario. Some will be installed to generate power in the province buoyed by the available green energy subsidies and others will be manufactured for export.

KEPCO has just sold four of its APR-1400 reactors to the UAE (United Arab Emirates) for about $20 billion US   under a mostly fixed price contract. Around $5 billion a copy is a real bargain price for a Generation III+ reactor.  This sale is the first shot in an ambitious campaign announced by the Korean government to capture 20% of the world reactor market. Incidentally, losing this sale was a real blow to AREVA who were outcompeted by the Koreans and one can guess that the days of the no longer formidable Anne Lauvergeon as AREVA CEO are numbered.

The APR-1400 is an advanced light water reactor based on a design by Combustion Engineering called the System 80. The Koreans have used System 80 as the basis for a domestic Generation III reactor, the OPR-1000, of which six are operation and four under construction. The APR-1400 is essentially a System 80+ design. Two are now under construction in Korea with six more planned.   

As our readers will recall, Korea operates four AECL built CANDU 6 reactors at its Wolsung power station. The first of them, on stream in 1983, is now being refurbished in part by AECL.  Canada and Korea have a continuing close and productive collaboration in the nuclear area arising from the Wolsung projects.

Another recent development was the positive outlook for the sale of a HANARO research reactor from Korea to Jordan. Sales of research reactors are also part of Korea’s aggressive marketing plan. The essential technology for HANARO was transferred to Korea by AECL during the negotiations for the sale of the last three Wolsung CANDUs. Although as I understand it, HANARO doesn’t mean “Maple that works” in Korean that’s exactly what it is.

I see a real constellation of possibilities offered by the above.

• Is the APR-1400 a feasible power reactor choice for Ontario?
• Would a HANARO reactor be a feasible research and isotope production platform for Canada?
• Is KEPCO an aggressive and successful player that could take over AECL and run with it?  

I believe that the answers are, if not a straight “yes”, at least a “let’s seriously look at it”. Given the penchant for secrecy, perhaps unknown to us these ideas are already being considered by governments. In any case, Korea would make an excellent nuclear partner for Canada.

 Yes. We do need a new multi-purpose research reactor if Canada is going to stay in the nuclear game. That’s their main conclusion and I agree completely.  I would have liked to have seen an additional statement that the new reactor should be at Chalk River. That would have finally killed the dangerous and naïve idea of locating an isotope processing facility with associated fission product storage on a university campus as has been suggested for Saskatchewan.

It’s great the panel also rejected the “full speed ahead and damn the torpedoes” attitude of the Maple resurrectionists. Macho doesn’t cut it when it comes to nuclear technology especially when the justification is simply commercial expediency. Speaking of money there was a clear statement that the Canadian taxpayer had long been subsidizing nuclear medicine in many countries around the world and by implication that it should stop. These subsidies end up in the hands of a long chain of middlemen and greedy medical specialists. They don’t do patients any good.  

Hopefully we’ve seen the last of the loopy accelerator ideas and I certainly would like to think more about the cyclotron concept. I was a bit surprised they didn’t list all the submissions in an appendix of some kind but that doesn’t really matter all that much.

Now it all boils down to whether the government will ante up the cash for a new reactor and who could build one. There’s the Opal in Australia built by Argentina, the new research reactor just sold by Korea to Jordan and my favorite the Jules Horowitz reactor in France. Maybe we could clone one of them.

The key point is Canada must have access to a high flux multi-purpose research reactor, either our own or as a member of an international partnership.

He founded the Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI) by contributing substantial startup funding followed by another large donation by RIM’s other Co-CEO, Mike Lazaridis.  The Federal and Ontario governments have also granted significant funds as have other organizations and individuals. 

CIGI is a think tank with the overall objective of improving governance by several means and their web site highlights their many interests and activities http://www.cigionline.org/

The relevance of GIGI to the topic of this blog is the Nuclear Energy Futures Project, quoting from their website. “CIGI’s Nuclear Energy Futures Project is being conducted in partnership with the Canadian Centre for Treaty Compliance (CCTC) at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University, Ottawa. The aim of the project is to investigate the implications of the so-called renaissance for nuclear safety, security and nonproliferation over the coming two decades and to make recommendations for consideration by the international community.”

The project is directed by Louise Fréchette, a former deputy secretary-general of the United Nations, who has had a long involvement in matters nuclear.

The Nuclear Futures Project has already produced some 8 reports. Ken Dormuth and I wrote the one on enrichment and so I have some bias. Be that as it may, I believe that the CIGI reports have already had an impact on the formation of Canadian nuclear policy and that they have influenced decision makers.  However, I’ve not seen any sign of discussion of CIGI’s work among the usual players in the nuclear industry. It deserves more attention than it has received.

The latest report in the CIGI series “Canadian Nuclear Industry Status and Prospects” ought to be interesting for readers of this blog. 

http://www.cigionline.org/publications/2009/11/canadian-nuclear-industry-status-and-prospects

Well not really, it just seems that way.

The need to replace the pressure tubes in CANDU reactors after 25 years or so of operation has always been considered a significant disadvantage of the design. Retubing is very complex since the tubes are integral parts of the reactor core. The whole operation must be done in high radioactivity fields in cramped spaces within the reactor confinement structure. Special remote handling tools and techniques need to be developed on a custom basis since each reactor will be somewhat different. To make matters even more complicated, often the owners “take the opportunity” to replace many other components, steam generators for example, while the reactor is down. The whole process has come to be called refurbishment.

To be fair other types of reactors also need mid-life repairs. In the past ten years or so the tops (lids) of several US light water reactor pressure vessels have had to be replaced due to premature corrosion. This is a big undertaking in itself but is still a much smaller job than retubing a CANDU. Many US reactors are licensed for 40 to 60 year lifetimes and the possibility of an 80 year or longer lifetime is being researched. 

Refurbishment of CANDUs has had a chequered history. The first two Pickering reactors had to be retubed in the 1970’s because a poor alloy was originally selected for the pressure tubes. This set the precedent for refurbishment as an expensive and lengthy undertaking. Refurbishing all four of the Pickering A reactors by OPG cost at least $3 billion total for just two of the reactors. It was subsequently decided that refurbishing the other two was too expensive and they were essentially shut down permanently.  Bruce Power has been soldiering on for the last few years refurbishing two or three of the four Bruce A reactors at a total cost apparently approaching $4 billion. The New Brunswick reactor overhaul, as reported previously in this blog, continues to be over budget and is lagging months behind  schedule with no end in sight.      

As for future CANDUs, it’s disappointing to me that the ACR -1000 design envisages refurbishment after 25-30 years. My hope was that they could have avoided this problem by designing more robust pressure tubes. It could be more even difficult to retube an ACR (if one is ever built) because the core has much smaller dimensions - hell in a very small place?

In spite of all its problems, there is an upside to refurbishment. With no possibility of building new reactors for five or ten years or more, it’s the only game in town for Canada’s nuclear industry. 

The funding for these projects buys goods and services provided by the many companies, great and small, that comprise the nuclear industry. Without it many of them wouldn’t survive.  Cost overruns are mainly labour costs which keep highly skilled engineers employed; preserving the specialized expertise needed to eventually build new reactors. Furthermore, it is apparent that even though refurbishing an existing reactor is costly, it is still much cheaper than building a new one.

So roll on refurbishment, it will likely continue to be the sustaining activity of our nuclear industry for years to come.

Firstly, I should state my opinion that although composed of very accomplished individuals selected from this country’s great and good, I don’t believe the panel has the appropriate mix of knowledge and expertise. For example, it seems to me the membership is heavily tilted to the demand side (“unlimited low cost isotopes”) with no restraining supply side balance to better reflect technical and economic realities. I’m sorry to say that personally I don’t have much confidence in the panel. 

Nevertheless, with no expectation that they’ll pay any attention whatever, the following is my advice to the panel.

• Don’t attempt to bring the Maples back from the dead.

This is the favoured simple-minded solution touted to solve the isotope problem but in my opinion it’s not only unlikely to succeed but also possibly dangerous. To my mind operating the Maples without understanding their characteristics would be like flying an aircraft whose control surfaces are unpredictable. The Maples are dead for very good reasons, leave them that way.  

• Don’t process and store fission products anywhere other than at a nuclear installation.

Many schemes for isotope production, including the one used now, involve fissioning enriched uranium targets which are then dissolved in order to extract the one fission product of most interest (molybdenum-99). However, you are then struck with safely handling and storing all the other highly radioactive fission products in liquid form in specially designed tanks for a very long time. This is not only expensive but can be dangerous because of the possibility of criticality accidents where the material stored in the tanks starts fissioning on its own – a real disaster in a built up area. It’s probably feasible to irradiate the targets for example in a reactor or accelerator on a university campus but in my opinion totally irresponsible to process them there.     

• Don’t ignore the economics of the isotope business.

I believe (see other posts on this topic) that a fundamental problem is that the economics of the isotope business are badly off kilter. It doesn’t make sense for some of the players. My impression is that Canadian taxpayers heavily subsidize present production both for domestic and international use. If Canada is being altruistic then let’s hear the numbers. I may well be wrong about this but I’d like to know the truth.

• Do ask who type questions.

Whatever plan is proposed will require skilled people to do it. For instance, it’s no use for the committee to recommend building an isotope production reactor in Saskatchewan if there is no one capable of building one. Maybe they would simply contract with the same Argentine group that Australia employed to build their Opal reactor.  Whatever they plan we would have to be convinced that there were the personnel to do it. As another example, I believe there are people capable of refurbishing NRU following the original design but I’m fairly sure from recent experience that there is no capability to get the Maples operating safely. It’s much easier to recommend schemes than it is to execute them. Therefore, we need to know who is going to do the work.

• Do ensure a nuclear research capability for Canada.

Granted this is related to much more contentious issues surrounding the future of the nuclear industry in Canada. However, there were reasons for operating NRU other than just isotope production. I’d like to see a solution that keeps the same capabilities. To me the ideal solution would be to spend the money and take the time to replace the NRU vessel and do other refurbishment to extend the life of that reactor for decades to come. However, if it is decided to go an isotope only route, there is also the possibility of becoming a member of a research consortium such as the Jules Horowitz reactor in France, a state of the art materials reactor with the participation of Europe, Japan and India. That I think that would suit Canada very well if we didn’t have our own research reactor.

Now I guess it’s time for me to sit back and watch the circus.

The Ontario government has announced that it’s suspending its competition for new nuclear reactors because only the AECL bid met its requirements but even so their price was much too high.

Media reaction was muted and at first many including me assumed the suspension to be a political ploy on the part of Ontario government to induce the federal government to subsidize its new nuclear plants. In fact, many approving noises were made in the media, mainly making the point that there’s no particular need to rush to a decision. This because electricity demand is declining in Ontario due to the recession (but for how long?), additional generation facilities (including refurbished nuclear stations) are due to come on line in the next few years and the delay will give us time to see how other supply choices work out.

However, rumours (or more likely deliberate leaks) are now emerging that the bids received were very high. One report said that the AECL bid was $26 billion for two ACRs. That in my view is absurdly high.

So what are the facts? As regular readers of this blog will guess, the aspect that annoys me most about the Ontario competition is the continuing secrecy and lack of transparency surrounding the whole process.

For example, we need to know such things as:

• Why were the AREVA and Westinghouse reactors rejected?
• Did the evaluators consider the ACR technically superior to the other two reactors?
• What were the prices quoted for each of the reactors?
• What does the Ontario government consider a reasonable price as compared with the AECL bid price?

General answers to these questions and others must be forthcoming.  After all the citizens of Ontario have spent a lot of money on the answers although of course we’ll never know how much. We don’t need to know a high level of detail. Nevertheless, we must be told enough to have confidence in the soundness of the judgment that was made.

In the end it may be that the prices of new nuclear plants have simply become so high that few jurisdictions can afford them.  If Ontario can’t afford new reactors then the same must hold for New Brunswick, Alberta and Saskatchewan. In that case there will be no Nuclear Renaissance in Canada which would be a shame since we need this energy option but not at any price.    

Of course, what’s happening is the government is distancing itself from AECL, now about to be thrown under the bus. The Maple fiasco and the breakdown of NRU which the Maples were intended to replace have caused such a public outcry about the now restricted supply of medical isotopes that the government can no longer afford to consume its political capital supporting AECL. 

The plan to “restructure” AECL as announced according to the National Bank study is to sell the reactor repair and sales businesses and keep what remains of the Chalk River R&D effort. However, dedicated R&D, backed by a research reactor comparable to NRU, is absolutely essential to the success of a nuclear power system. In particular, a new and untried reactor such as the ACR-1000 would need exactly this capability for example to investigate component failures, test safety concepts and develop new fuels. Maintaining and improving that sort of strong R&D capability is a primary reason why development of a Generation III+ reactor such as the ACR costs billions of dollars. Clearly Canada isn’t willing to spend that kind of money on the ACR. In particular, no potential purchaser would want to buy an ACR with no assured R&D backup and thus, in effect the restructuring is the end of the ACR.

In such circumstances the media predictably trot out that well-worn Canadian icon, the Avro Arrow but it’s not a good analogy. The CANDU has been “flying” for about 50 years and will be with us for decades to come in terms of refurbished reactors. Therefore, the CANDU is not like the Arrow, seemingly cut off before it had a chance to prove itself, but rather a technology that has been heavily supported by Canada for decades. The issue is whether to extend the technology to another level, i.e. the ACR, or to rejoin the world mainstream with an advanced light water reactor.  As discussed elsewhere in this blog, there are arguments on both sides of that issue.

The fundamental problem with AECL has been a series of very poor decisions over the last 15-20 years. The other day, I happened across an internal AECL memo from 1994 announcing that it had been decided that NRU would not get a new calandria (essentially an extensive rebuild). Rather AECL would embark on the Maples for isotope production and would not need an all purpose reactor of the NRU type.  There was even a suggestion to build a ridiculously complicated experimental reactor with two separate but interacting cores to replace NRU; thankfully that was not attempted. I can remember during those halcyon days of the China CANDU project  that many engineers from Sheridan Park were arguing that they could use the Halden reactor in Norway for any reactor R&D they might need.  As it turned out, that single 1994 decision not to rebuild NRU has turned out to have had momentous repercussions notably the impending demise of AECL as it once was.

I’ve already written a couple of pieces in this blog about NRU and its problems but I’d like to come back to a theme that I first introduced in my January 2 post. Namely, that the current level of medical isotope use is not sustainable.

Do we really need to produce and use medical isotopes at the current level? It seems nobody has stepped back to consider this key question in a serious way. Instead all sorts of expedients to maintain the current production level are under consideration.

The first but least likely solution is to fix NRU. If it is possible to repair it in a reasonable time (doubtful), it’s only a short-term fix. There’s a reported rumour that some “nuclear engineers” want to restart the MAPLE project.  After the laughter died down, I have to concede there is something in the idea at least in terms of regulation. Given the present climate in government, CNSC would only pretend to regulate a MAPLE redux probably by making appropriate noises of no substantive content. The likely consequence would be that these apocryphal engineers would be enabled to do some “light dusting” of the existing MAPLEs all the time waving the banner of isotope production and then start them up. I suppose that if there was a good containment structure around the MAPLEs, the consequences of an accident (the MAPLES were infamous for control rods that wouldn’t engage reliably) would not be so severe.  But is there anything left to dust? Can the project be revived at this stage or are they too far down the decommissioning road?

There is also an innovative scheme to make some isotopes by photo-neutron methods at TRIUMF in Vancouver but it is only in the conceptual stage. I read that the University of Missouri wants to get into isotope production in a big way about five years from now. If that means they plan to irradiate enriched uranium targets (requiring heavy security) and store the highly radioactive fission product liquid waste, it’s a totally inappropriate activity for a university campus in my opinion. A criticality accident in the fission product storage tanks would result in many casualties in a densely populated area like a campus. Large scale isotope production should only be undertaken at an isolated nuclear reservation such as Chalk River or one of the US national labs such as Oak Ridge.

The few isotope production reactors in other countries are also old and in bad shape. It’s a good time to seriously consider whether society can or indeed needs to continue the present system of isotope supply. The current and future shortage mostly concerns technicium-99 which is extensively used in diagnostic tests. Do we really need so much technicium-99? The supply of the main therapeutic isotope, cobalt-60, is assured from power reactors and many other diagnostic and therapeutic isotopes with longer half lives are not so seriously affected.  

Before we go running off to implement desperate measures such as reviving the MAPLEs or embarking on intensive isotope production on university campuses, we should have an authoritative and objective assessment by an independent internationally respected institution (e.g. the Harvard School of Public Health) that spells out what technecium-99 tests are essential in the sense that there are no other tests that can be reasonably substituted. This would tell us what production level is really needed as distinct from what is desired by the specialists in the field and would form the basis for a sustainable plan for isotope production.

It’s clear that the old days of abundant supplies of cheap isotopes are over and the former altruistic attitude that the Canadian taxpayer should subsidize the world isotope supply (or more accurately the middlemen in the value chain) is hopefully long gone. Rather we must insist on a realistic price for isotopes that reflects their real cost, doing so will also serve to regulate demand.