Nuclear Reactors for Canada

Like everyone else in the nuclear community I have been thinking about the Fukushima nuclear disaster although I went on a month long vacation in the South Pacific when thankfully I didn’t think about it at all. Since the accident I’ve had a number of media requests to comment but I’ve declined them all in favour of putting down my thoughts in this blog - so here goes.

My first point is that Fukushima doesn’t mean the end of nuclear power. As the world population increases and an ever larger proportion of it demands the high consumption life style of the developed world there will be a rapidly growing demand for energy, particularly high quality electrical energy. The foregoing plus the low carbon character of nuclear technology dear to the remaining believers in climate change summarize the main arguments in favour of nuclear energy. I’d say that this reasoning is plausible with due deference to Vaclav Smil’s observation that all energy predictions turn out to be wrong (an idea amply demonstrated, for example, by the energy demand projections of the Ontario Power Authority).

There is another factor that I would call nuclear inertia, namely those jurisdictions most dependent on nuclear power will have the greatest difficulty getting out of it. France is one such jurisdiction with around 80% or more of its electricity generated by nuclear reactors. There is no obvious way that the French could get out of nuclear energy even if they wanted to. On the other hand countries such as Switzerland and Italy that have resolved to go non-nuclear in the wake of Fukushima can relatively easily exit the nuclear arena as they have announced they will. It is even easier for Thailand and Malaysia which were looking at reactors but have now have decided against them.

Germany’s decision to phase out nuclear power is by far the most significant for the future of nuclear energy. The issue is not whether the German decision will cause others to drop out in the short term but rather it is whether Germany can succeed in the longer term in shedding its nuclear stations. If it convincingly shows that it can replace the nuclear share of electricity (20%) by renewables and conservation over the next decade then I’d say the nuclear future in North America and Europe would be clouded.

I believe Germany has a good chance of achieving its goal. It has considerable experience with renewables, a very strong high technology industrial base, and most importantly the political will and public support needed. During the transition period, they can import coal-generated electricity from Poland and ironically nuclear electricity from France if needed. I think the odds are that they will succeed.

In terms of the world outlook, it appears that nuclear power will continue its strong growth in China and India with moderate increases also in Korea and Russia. These countries have concluded that they don’t have any other choice. Although I’m particularly concerned about issues of the supply chain, quality control and business corruption, all things considered I have no doubt that the nuclear enterprise will continue unabated in Asia.

Looking at our situation in Canada, I don’t see how Ontario could feasibly get out of nuclear in the short term. The government of Ontario has been experimenting with renewables but in my opinion has made a huge blunder by entering into a sole source contract (said to be worth $7 billion) with Samsung apparently aimed at increasing “green” manufacturing in the province. As with all too many of Ontario’s transactions with business the contract is secret and the opposition parties can’t even find out what it would cost to cancel the contract. The bottom-line here is that Ontario unlike Germany would be totally incapable of any transition out of nuclear.

The New Brunswick follies continue over the refurbishment of the Point Lepreau reactor and the main issue has now become the content of the contract between AECL and New Brunswick with reference to cost overruns. You guessed it: the contract is secret. It makes me feel warm and fuzzy to see New Brunswick shafted by its own obsessive secrecy and likely the same will happen to the current Ontario government with regard to the Samsung contract. The only possibility of a Canadian retreat from nuclear power that I think we’ll see in Canada is Quebec will not go ahead with the refurbishment of the Gentilly II reactor and ultimately decommission it. Much of the reason for this decision will be based on the poor performance of the Point Lepreau project with only a small push from Fukushima.

Bruce Power (BP) has finally got a license to ship 16 old nuclear steam generators resulting from refurbishment by boat to Sweden via the Great Lakes. Since the total shipment is only mildly radioactive and the radioactivity is spread over 100’s of tons of metal, it’s safe to ship them provided they are well secured.  In Sweden the volume of material containing the radioactive material will be reduced to about 10% of the original but still contain almost all the radioactive material extracted from the generators. This will then be returned to the Bruce site for final burial. Contrary to what the media tend to say, the total radioactivity to be buried at Bruce will not change, only the volume of material containing it. Therefore, there will be two shipments: the first of the steam generators to Sweden and the second the same amount of radioactivity in a smaller volume from Sweden back to Bruce.

The above is explained in the BP website dedicated to the shipment plan http://www.rightthingtodo.ca/

The environmental argument for this plan is that it reduces the environmental footprint whatever that means in this case. The CNSC (the nuclear regulator) says in the presentation given on the above website that this plan would “recycle 90% of the clean metal. This is good for the environment and in accordance with CNSC policy.” To judge whether it would be “good” we’d need to know how the Swedes intend to recycle the steel recovered.  Maybe it will end up in Volvo’s or Saab’s? The CNSC also says “Shipping the generators will reduce the environmental footprint. This is good nuclear management.” This is shifting the ground somewhat because nuclear management suggests responsibly in dealing with radioactivity which is neutral in this case since all that has been done is to repackage the same amount of radioactivity. I see buzz words but not an environmental case strong enough to send the material on a round trip cruise to Sweden. If BP is that interested in the environment, I believe the “right thing to do” would be to make a deal with the Swedes to set up a similar facility at Bruce – there would be a lot of business for it from domestic refurbishment projects.  

The whole affair has been ugly and brought out the worst in many of those involved.  From the start it was clear that most municipal politicians and native groups along the route of the shipment would strenuously object to it. As some wise man pointed out, all politics is local and the local worthies feel that they must be seen to be protecting their constituents against real or in this case imagined dangers. Also chiming in with their various agendas were the usual confederacy of motley twits namely NGOs sounding off to ensure continued funding from their misguided supporters, self-promoting activists of all stripes and chronic protesters who just enjoy demonstrating as a sport. I wish more had shown the honesty and common sense of the February 9 editorial in the St. Catharine’s Standard entitled “We Share a Responsibility for Nuclear Waste” which rightly points out that everyone who uses electricity in Ontario is responsible for a share of the waste.  

The brouhaha around the issue was entirely predictable. My question is why would Bruce Power want to put up with all that aggravation just to reduce the volume of the waste? BP’s undoubted environmental altruism doesn’t seem to me to stretch that far. Follow the money is the tried and true rule for understanding corporate behaviour. Therefore, I have concluded that there must a strong business case for the shipping plan. How could this be? BP people often forget to mention that they’re leasing their assets from Ontario Power Generation and it may well be that burying the steam generators, sixteen of them each as big as a school bus, at the Bruce site owned by OPG might prove very expensive not because of their relatively low radioactivity but due to their very large volume. If I’m right, the cost would be so high that it is cheaper to ship them to Sweden in order to reduce their volume compared to just burying them as they are. We can also surmise that shipping would also be cheaper than acquiring the Swedish technology. Of course, saving money is not a bad thing for a private corporation. However, I’m afraid that Bruce Power may have set itself up for a potentially embarrassing gotcha moment in the media when and if, what I believe to be their financial “hidden agenda”, is revealed.     

Since refurbishment at Bruce will go on for at least a decade or more likely two, there could be many more such shipments. Once the Great Lakes route is established by this first shipment, the refurbishment activities planned for Darlington could use this method. However, I believe the better way is a deal with the Swedes for the rights to use their technology in Canada avoiding shipping altogether.

At last something to comment on! It has just been reported that negotiations between Bruce Power and SNC-Lavalin and the federal government to sell AECL have broken down. Most of the reports simply say just that and then go on to speculate about the consequences.

A little more speculation is worth a try since as usual all factual information on the negotiations is being kept secret. The biggest question to my mind is: Was the amount the federal government offered prospective buyers to take the company off its hands too small? Surely, nobody believes that the feds are going to realize any real money from the sale of AECL.  Their main objective has to be to stop the AECL- induced bleeding from the treasury. In most recent fiscal years this has been in the $3-500M range and one year it was over $1Billion. So what valuation for the liability would be fair? I’d say the feds would be doing well to get away with paying $5Billion to the buyers but more likely $10Billion.   

Part of the payout from the feds should be to fund a transition period (5 years?) between public and private ownership to help the buyers to shed liabilities.  Some portion of this must be set aside to fully ensure the pension and severance rights of the current employees. Therefore, we can ask: Was the annual subsidy the government offered the buyers too low?

Of course, the feds would need to spin their funding of the buy out using labels such as restructuring contributions, transitional payments, and no doubt other inventive Newspeak phrases that don’t directly reveal the’re paying the buyers. I’ve have no doubt they can do that.

On the technical front I’d like to know whether the feds were unwilling to throw the ACR under the bus. The most extraordinary feature of the ACR is how few nuclear people inside or outside AECL are in favour of it.  I certainly think it belongs under the proverbial bus for reasons I’ve given elsewhere on this blog and I can’t imagine prospective buyers wanting to continue its development. 

Was the buyer obligated to try to sell CANDUs? If there are prospects for foreign sales then the good old CANDU 6 (or whatever they are calling it now) is a reasonable entry level reactor for countries new to the nuclear game.  It would have to be retubed every 25 years or so and R&D on designs for easier refurbishment methods (maybe a one piece change out of the reactor core through the containment) would make it much more attractive. That solution might even work for Ontario. If the feds want the buyers to sell CANDU’s then SNC would do that well (with the appropriate subsidy) but I can’t see Bruce Power in that business. Perhaps, they could split AECL between them?

Refusal to reveal any information about these dealings is cloaked by the usual lame excuses about proprietary and commercial information. Those involved tend to imply that the public and the media are asking for detailed technical information. Not true, we only need to know the broad lines of the issues.  If they actually believe that’s a problem, go to Staples and buy a black marker for redacting out any technical stuff. In my opinion commercial secrecy is just an excuse for hiding a variety of sins (fill in your own list here).

Speakingb of commercial, this isn’t a deal between, for example Ford and GM, but rather one in which 10s of billions of taxpayer dollars are involved. Whatever is decided we the public are going to pay for it so we should know what’s going on.

Ontario is blaming Ottawa for the uncertainty created by selling AECL. This is the same Ontario government which has consistently refused to release any information about their highly secretive reactor selection process. We’ve never been told what went on then and presumably never will.  They are always re-announcing the two new build reactors at Darlington but I must have missed the announcement of how much funding Ontario is contributing to the restructuring of AECL given all their rhetoric about jobs and the importance of the nuclear industry to the province. Ontario was part of the recent auto industry bailout so why can’t it do the same for the nuclear industry?  

Are the negotiations really on the rocks or is this just a pause for a reality check? Bruce Power and SNC-Lavalin have very sharp management teams and they know very well that the federal government can’t afford the embarrassment of not being able to sell AECL. I’ll go out on a limb and predict we’ll see them all back at the bargaining table fairly soon.

Recently there’s been a lot of discussion, some on this blog,, about isotope supply problems but as yet I haven’t seen much on the public dangers inherent in the wide spread use of isotopes for peaceful purposes. Technicium-99, the isotope at the heart of the current world shortage, is not likely to cause problems but other isotopes give rise to a dark side that can’t be ignored.

What brought this to mind is the April incident when a Cobalt-60 source turned up at a scrap yard in New Delhi India. The source came from a Canadian gamma cell irradiator used in the chemistry department at the University of New Delhi (Is there anything of interest left to research in radiation chemistry?). The scrap dealer died from exposure and six others were hospitalized with radiation sickness. This accident also gives rise to moral issues such as the responsibilities of Canada in terms of taking back for safe disposal sources that were provided under “foreign aid” programs. 

Over the years there have been other such scrap yard isotope incidents. Dredging my by no means perfect memory I recall an incident when detectors sited on a highway near the Los Alamos labs picked up radiation from a passing truck containing metal patio furniture from Mexico.  In another, in Brazil I believe, highly radioactive material was incorporated in steel rebar used to reinforce the concrete of an apartment building. This sometimes comes up in arguments about the beneficial properties of low level radiation since it seems that the inhabitants of the building had less cancer than the general population. In both cases scrap yards had melted radioactive sources into metal used for other purposes.

There may be a temptation to write off the Indian accident as a result of stupidity, incompetence and/or corruption at a third-world university, the University of New Delhi. However, according to the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission’s 2009  Annual Report 2,251 of the 21,354 sealed sources for medical and industrial uses it licences are of the very high risk category (radiation exposure of a few minutes to a few hours would be fatal) and another 13,967 are in the high risk category (few hours to few days fatal exposure). Fortunately no sources in these highest risk categories have gone missing in this country in the past few years but as of April 1, 2009, 16 of the 24 sources that were lost or stolen in 2007-08 and 6 of the 8 in 2008-09 were still unrecovered.  Clearly Canada is much better at tracking sources than India.  We also have radiation detectors at our dumps and scrap yards. Nevertheless safeguarding the more than 16,000 sources in the highest risk categories is a formidable and likely impossible task if a determined terrorist was intent on stealing one.              

Accidentally irradiating members of the public is not the worst that can happen. The really scary possibility is using one or more stolen sources as the basis of a radiological attack.

To produce a true (fission) nuclear weapon requires a multiyear national program costing tens or even hundreds of billions of dollars judging from the efforts in Iran and North Korea.  Contrary to popular opinion a nuclear weapon can’t be made in someone’s garage from stolen fissionable material.

On the other hand a radiological “weapon” simply consists of a highly radioactive source (say one of the more than 16,000 in Canada or one on its way to a third world scrap yard) combined with some means, conventional explosive or even some salt shaker type device, of dispersing its radioactive material over a relatively wide area. That wouldn’t cause the tremendous number of blast and burn casualties of a fission weapon but it might well render areas of a city unusable for weeks or months while causing panic due to the public phobia of radiation. Imagine the consequences at, for example, the London Olympics in 2012 or even the coming G20 in Toronto. The sad fact is that there is an apparently unlimited supply of maniacal terrorists, foreign and domestic, capable of committing such an atrocity. Indeed, the suicidal tendencies of these fanatics could also help them in handling highly radioactive sources.  I’ve been increasingly concerned about this eventuality since the 9/11 attacks and I’m surprised although thankful that it hasn’t happened already.

In order to reap their benefits, medical and industrial isotopes must be widely available and easily accessible. However, there are clear risks associated with failure to effectively safeguard them. Recognizing and better managing these risks especially in third-world countries is essential in this new and dangerous era of terrorism.  

In its response to the report of the isotope panel report the government announced that it will not fund a new multi-purpose research reactor to replace NRU. Unless this decision is reversed, it means the end of a 60 year tradition of nuclear research in Canada.

To me, the issue is can this decision be reversed? The best case scenario would be that NRU is successfully repaired and operates for another 5 years during which plans can be made and the lobbying done for a new reactor hopefully to a more sympathetic group of politicians and officials  

The crew repairing NRU is really doing a valiant job in a very difficult situation and I very much commend them for their openness. Their website has up-to-date information but doesn’t attempt to minimize the difficulties involved.  http://www.nrucanada.ca/

Recently I was asked whether there was a chance NRU couldn’t be repaired in terms of returning to its former functionality. I have to admit that this is certainly a possibility but I can’t assess the probability of it happening. For example, the welding used to make the repairs distorts the rector vessel locally which may make it difficult to get a leak-tight seal at the bottom of the vessel. We can only hope that the repair team will succeed in overcoming this and the many other problems involved. 

My experience has been that it is very difficult to restart research programs once they have been cancelled. The day after cancellation it is found that the sky hasn’t fallen despite the dire warnings of those involved in the program and life goes on as usual. In fact the attitude soon becomes “why did we need that program in the first place?”  My point is that if NRU doesn’t come back to provide the needed breathing space to launch a replacement reactor then domestic nuclear R&D will effectively end.

As I said recently to a regular reader of this blog, I haven’t been posting much because of the unrelievedly gloomy situation in the Canadian nuclear industry but I suppose even negatives need to be discussed.

This is the main message of the “The Future of Nuclear Energy to 2030 and Its Implications for Safety, Security and Non-proliferation: Overview” of the CIGI Nuclear Energy Futures Project by Trevor Findlay.

http://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/Nuclear%20Energy%20Futures%20Overview.pdf

I introduced CIGI in a previous post “Nuclear Policy and the Phoenix Coyotes”. This project has taken some three to four years and as a minor participant I can testify to the project’s objectivity and thoroughness. CIGI is by no means antinuclear and in my opinion the report accurately reflects the true state of nuclear energy today.  

In addition to a variety of useful data collected by the project, the report contains an objective assessment of the barriers facing the expansion of nuclear power. The resulting conclusion is that few additional nuclear plants will be built before 2030.

This, the overview of the Nuclear Energy Futures Project final reports, should be required reading for all those interested in nuclear energy. Clearly, the Canadian media have taken it seriously. Even more important for the future of Canada’s nuclear industry is that this report will influence the politicians and officials dealing with the domestic nuclear file.

I would suggest Trevor Findlay be invited to present his findings at the Canadian Nuclear Society Annual Conference in Montreal this June. I would also like to see him address the Canadian Nuclear Association seminar in Ottawa later this month but that’s unlikely since only “preaching to the choir” is allowed at the seminars.

If we don’t understand the problems, we won’t be able to develop the solutions  

Let’s play join the dots. 

The Ontario government announced last week a deal negotiated in secret with Samsung and KEPCO (Korean Electric Power Company) to build wind turbines and solar panels in Ontario. Some will be installed to generate power in the province buoyed by the available green energy subsidies and others will be manufactured for export.

KEPCO has just sold four of its APR-1400 reactors to the UAE (United Arab Emirates) for about $20 billion US   under a mostly fixed price contract. Around $5 billion a copy is a real bargain price for a Generation III+ reactor.  This sale is the first shot in an ambitious campaign announced by the Korean government to capture 20% of the world reactor market. Incidentally, losing this sale was a real blow to AREVA who were outcompeted by the Koreans and one can guess that the days of the no longer formidable Anne Lauvergeon as AREVA CEO are numbered.

The APR-1400 is an advanced light water reactor based on a design by Combustion Engineering called the System 80. The Koreans have used System 80 as the basis for a domestic Generation III reactor, the OPR-1000, of which six are operation and four under construction. The APR-1400 is essentially a System 80+ design. Two are now under construction in Korea with six more planned.   

As our readers will recall, Korea operates four AECL built CANDU 6 reactors at its Wolsung power station. The first of them, on stream in 1983, is now being refurbished in part by AECL.  Canada and Korea have a continuing close and productive collaboration in the nuclear area arising from the Wolsung projects.

Another recent development was the positive outlook for the sale of a HANARO research reactor from Korea to Jordan. Sales of research reactors are also part of Korea’s aggressive marketing plan. The essential technology for HANARO was transferred to Korea by AECL during the negotiations for the sale of the last three Wolsung CANDUs. Although as I understand it, HANARO doesn’t mean “Maple that works” in Korean that’s exactly what it is.

I see a real constellation of possibilities offered by the above.

• Is the APR-1400 a feasible power reactor choice for Ontario?
• Would a HANARO reactor be a feasible research and isotope production platform for Canada?
• Is KEPCO an aggressive and successful player that could take over AECL and run with it?  

I believe that the answers are, if not a straight “yes”, at least a “let’s seriously look at it”. Given the penchant for secrecy, perhaps unknown to us these ideas are already being considered by governments. In any case, Korea would make an excellent nuclear partner for Canada.

In September, I chatted informally with several AREVA people in France about the construction problems the EPR was having in Finland. Many of them blamed the Finns, especially the Finnish nuclear safety agency, as very difficult customers following what appeared to be the AREVA party line. One engineer was perhaps more frank than his colleagues admitting that “it’s been a long time since anyone built a reactor” which is probably close to the truth.  I also had a glimpse of the second EPR under construction at Flamanville on the Normandy coast. It looked to be going well. I left France with the impression that the schedule slippage and cost overruns on the EPR were just first-of-a-kind teething problems to be expected in building what I consider already an overly engineered and too complex reactor.

Imagine then my dismay when soon afterwards when it was reported that the nuclear regulators of the UK, France and Finland declared that the design of the EPR control system was fundamentally flawed. The operating and safety systems seemingly are not independent! Of course, they must be completely independent to provide the necessary high degree of safety. It’s as if they had built a car with the brake and accelerator systems somehow coupled. If the regulatory judgements turn out to be true then this is a momentous blunder in a reactor specifically engineered to ensure a high degree of safety.  If the designers have failed in such a basic principle then what other mistakes have they made? It is reported that AREVA has now lashed up some work-around analogue system but personally I have lost any residual confidence I may have once had in this design. I guess it also shows the Finns are not so dumb after all.

Over in the other corner the Westinghouse AP1000 has been found to have a faulty structural design for the so-called shield building which surrounds the containment structure as a first line of defence against severe storms and other possible impact events. It seems the shield building cannot take the loads that it has to support, especially the thousands of tons of dousing water at the top of the containment. Apparently this problem has been known to US nuclear regulators for at least a year and various tests and possibly redesigns are underway to correct this major flaw.  This again is a disappointing situation.

Is the GE-Hitachi ABWR faring any better than these two?   It wasn’t a contestant in the Ontario competition and so I haven’t been following it very closely. However, it does seem to be flying somewhat below the radar compared to the EPR and the AP1000.

These problems with its former competitors shouldn’t cause any joy in AECL. Its ACR-1000 is still firmly stuck on the drawing board with no realistic prospects of construction.  While their design “won” the Ontario competition, there is no indication that either the feds or Ontario are willing to incur yet more debt (another $20 to 30 billion or likely much more) in these tough economic times by building two ACRs at Darlington. The two levels of government are supposed to negotiating the cost split but I’m not optimistic.

Meanwhile there is no chance New Brunswick Power (now owned by Hydro Quebec) will build any new reactor after the Pt Lepreau refurbishment fiasco. Saskatchewan is fixated on a research reactor (but only if the feds ante up 75% of the costs).

That leaves Alberta with its own large deficit as the only other prospect for an ACR. Who knows maybe a reactor to get rid of it coal-fired generating plants would help in shielding the oilsands province from the attacks of the warmers? It’s probably better than just being perceived as a province of deniers since the warmers in spite of the recent allegations of scientific fraud have clearly won the day as the great Copenhagen dog and pony show unfolds.  Is that a realistic scenario?  Probably not!   

Let’s hope 2010 proves to be a better year for the nuclear enterprise than 2009.